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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Case No. 970606-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the court of appeals pursuant toUtah 
Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e). Ortiz also appeals as a matter of right under Rules 3 and 4 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Ortiz was charged with three (3) counts of aggravated burglary; three (3) counts of theft; 
and providing false information to a police officer. Ortiz was subsequently tried by a jury along 
with two (2) other defendants in the Third District Court, Tooele County. The jury returned a 
verdict of guilty on all counts. Ortiz was given a 5 years to life sentence for each first degree 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff Appellee, 
vs. 
CARLOS V ORTIZ, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
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felony, to be served in the Utah State Prison. Ortiz appeals the conviction based on the 
arguments contained herein. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the State violate the exclusionary rule when it called deputy Stidham as a rebuttal witness, 
and did this violate Ortiz' right to a fair trial? 
2. Did counsel for the State engage in prosecutorial misconduct when he inappropriately 
presented evidence of a prior adult conviction of defendant Mondragon, and did this prejudice the 
jury towards Ortiz? 
3. Did the State engage in prosecutorial misconduct during the cross-examination of Sharon Ortiz 
when it made an inflammatory comment regarding her son's involvement with a gang, and did this 
violate Ortiz' right to a fair trial? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Constitution Art. 1§7 Passim 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On or about September 25, 1997, defendant/appellant Carlos V. Ortiz ("Ortiz") was tried 
before a jury in the Third District Court, Tooele County, State of Utah, on the charges of three 
(3) counts of aggravated burglary; three (3) counts of theft; providing false information to a police 
officer and failure to stop. Ortiz was tried jointly with two other defendants-Elmer Mondragon, 
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Jr. and Roger S. Manzanares. 
Prior to commencement of trial, counsel for Ortiz, in chambers, moved to exclude all of 
the State's witnesses from the court room. (Exclusionary Argument Tr. 3). Counsel for the State 
objected and argued that he was entitled to have a police officer knowledgeable of the case 
present in the court room during trial. (Exclusionary Argument Tr. 4). In an effort to resolve the 
matter, Judge Rokich suggested that both interests could be served by allowing Deputy Stidham 
to remain in the court room throughout the trial, however, his testimony would be taken first, so 
as to comply with the intent of the exclusionary rule and not allow Stidham to hear the testimony 
of the State's or defendant's witnesses prior to his testimony. (Exclusionary Argument Tr. 6). 
This was agreed to by both counsel. 
Stidham testified on direct examination that one of the juveniles, Pablo Acevedo, agreed 
to show Stidham and Detective Sutherland ("Sutherland") which houses were burglarized. (R. 
114). Acevedo directed Stidham, who was driving his patrol vehicle, to an address on Blue Ridge 
Drive in Tooele. (R. 115). The following is the relevant part of Stidham's testimony regarding 
the drive with Acevedo: 
Beginning at p. 115 1. 18: 
(by State) Q: All right. What did he (Acevedo) tell you about that place? 
A: He stated that the purse and the phone were taken from that address. 
Q: And did he take you anywhere else? 
A: He then took us across town to another neighborhood, where he knew that we 
were close [sic], but wasn't able to find the house. 
Then he took us to a third neighborhood and eventually, we would [sic] up at 
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No. 10 Benchview. 
Q: And Benchview, where is that? 
A: That's up on the east, southeast side of town. 
Q: Is that part of the Benchmark? 
A: Yeah. Yes, it is. 
Q: All right. And what did he tell you about 10 Benchview? 
A: He stated that the golf clubs and tools were taken from that location? 
Q: All right. Were any of these items the items he had admitted taking, [sic] 
himself? 
A: I don't recall. He stated that he did take the telephone and one other item. 
Q: I'll show you a copy of his statement, if that refreshes your memory. 
A: Yes. He stated that he took the radar detector, and the cordless telephone and 
the tool boxes. 
Q: So, he personally did not take the golf clubs; is that correct? 
A: That's correct, according to him. 
Q: And he personally didn't take the purse or the cigarettes or any of the items 
from Mary Bate's [sic] house? 
A: That's correct. 
Stidham did not testify that Acevedo implicated Ortiz during the time they drove around 
Tooele looking for the homes that had been burglarized. Acevedo testified later in the trial that he 
was with Garza during the burglaries. In fact, Acevedo testified that Ortiz was never with him 
when he entered the garages. (R. 284). 
Sutherland testified after Stidham. (R. 183). Sutherland testified that Acevedo indicated 
that "all five of them would exit the vehicle" and go their separate directions. (R. 207). 
Sutherland also testified that Acevedo indicated which of the items stolen were stolen by him. (R. 
203). 
Following this new line of testimony brought out by Sutherland, Stidham was then called 
as a rebuttal witness for the State. (R. 321). At this time Stidham materially altered his previous 
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testimony in order to conform to Sutherland's testimony in the following manner: 
Beginning on p. 322,1. 4: 
A: As we were driving around and [sic] he took us to the houses, he would 
indicate which particular people went in to which particular houses. 
Q: Was it always just the two juveniles? 
A: No. It was not. 
Q: Who else was involved? 
A: He, at different houses, various locations, he named the three defendants, as 
well as himself and Mr. Garza. 
This line of questioning was objected to and sustained by the court. (In Chambers Tr. 3) 
This was a drastic change from the testimony given by Stidham during his first examination, not 
merely clarification. 
The defense, during its case-in-chief, called Elmer Mondragon, Jr. to the stand so that he 
might testify in his own defense. (R. 266). During cross-examination, counsel for the State 
presented Mondragon with a document that had not been turned over to counsel for the 
defendants. Counsel for the State asked Mondragon what the document was—Mondragon replied 
that it was a prior adult conviction. (R. 271). Counsel for the defendants objected to the 
admissibility of the document and it was sustained by the court. Prior to the objection, however, 
Mondragon had already answered the question and informed the jury that he had a prior adult 
conviction. (R. 271). This misconduct by the State is obvious and more likely than not 
prejudiced the jury towards all three of the defendants. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial judge in this case offered a compromise to counsel regarding the exclusionary 
rule. The judge suggested that the arresting officer remain in the court room throughout the trial, 
but that he would testify first so that he would not hear the testimony of the State's other 
witnesses. Counsel agreed to this arrangement. 
At the completion of the defendant's case, the State then called the officer in question as a 
rebuttal witness and had him testify to something completely new that he had heard one of the 
other witnesses for the State testify to. Ortiz intended on challenging the testimony of the second 
officer because it was completely different than that of the officer that had testified first. 
Counsel for the State presented evidence of a prior adult conviction of Defendant 
Mondragon while he was testifying on his own behalf This was objected to and sustained by the 
trial court. Defense counsel had filed a Request for Discovery in a timely fashion and was not 
furnished with this document. Such behavior amounts to prosecutorial misconduct. 
Counsel for the State also exceeded the scope of the direct-examination of Sharon Ortiz. 
The only testimony solicited from this witness on direct-examination were questions regarding the 
registration and insurance of the vehicle allegedly used in the burglaries. The first question asked 
by the State on cross-examination was, "I'm going to ask you some questions regarding your 
son's involvement with the Serenos 13 gang." Counsel for the State knew, or reasonably should 
have known, that such an inappropriate question would be objected to and sustained by the court. 
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Ortiz argues that the State intentionally attempted to prejudice the jury with this comment. 
ARGUMENT 
1. The State violated the exclusionary rule and committed prosecutorial misconduct by having 
Deputy Stidham testify as a rebuttal witness. 
Stidham never testified on direct examination that Acevedo indicated which homes were 
burglarized by which defendants. Stidham only testified to such fact after he heard the testimony 
of Sutherland which indicated that all three of the defendants were involved. Such action 
constitutes prosecutorial misconduct. 
In State v. Tenney. 913 P.2d 750, 754 (Utah App. 1996), the court held that a jury verdict 
will be reversed on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct if the defendant demonstrates that: 
[t]he actions or remarks of [the prosecutor] call to the attention of the jury a 
matter it would not be justified in considering in determining its verdict and, if so, 
under the circumstances of the particular case, whether the error is substantial and 
prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood that, in its absence, there 
would have been a more favorable result. 
The State would argue that having Stidham testify as a rebuttal witness on a totally new 
area merely clarified his previous testimony. That proposition fails after an examination of the 
record. In State v Rangel. 866 P.2d 607 (Utah App. 1993), the victim was allowed to remain in 
the court room throughout the trial. The prosecutor argued that the victim would only correct 
some errors in her earlier testimony which had nothing to do with the testimony given by any 
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other witnesses for the State. The trial court allowed the victim to retake the stand. After the 
victim had testified, the State rested. After completion of the defendant's case the State again 
called the victim to the stand without objection from defense counsel. The court of appeals 
stated: 
While allowing J.W. to testify both at the beginning and end of the prosecution's 
case could possibly result in unfairness, the record in this case clearly shows no 
prejudice. J.W. did not conform her testimony to the testimony of others. Rather, 
she simply clarified and added to her testimony from the day before on topics not 
covered by any other witnesses. J.W.'s additional testimony in no way 
compromised the procedural fairness of defendant's trail. 
Rangel is distinguishable from the present case because Stidham did conform his testimony 
to the testimony of others—namely Sutherland. Rangel is also distinguishable by the fact that the 
State agreed to have Stidham testify first so that he would not hear the testimony of any other 
witnesses examined by the State prior to his testimony. Ortiz does not challenge the discretion of 
the trial judge in this matter, rather he argues that the State's action constitute prosecutorial 
misconduct which prejudiced Ortiz' right to a fair trial—thus, the verdict should be set aside in the 
interests of justice. 
The jury considered matters they should not have heard when the State engaged in 
prosecutorial misconduct. (See, State v Tenney. supra.) Stidham never testified that Acevedo 
implicated Ortiz in the burglaries during the drive with him and Sutherland. Stidham only testified 
to this after he heard the testimony of Sutherland-he then altered his original testimony to 
conform to Sutherland's. Counsel for the State should have reasonably known that soliciting such 
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testimony could prejudice the jury because the evidence was only presented after Sutherland had 
testified that Acevedo had implicated the defendants. This was objected to by defense counsel 
and sustained by the trial court in chambers. (In Chambers Tr. 3). Such evidence clearly violated 
the exclusionary rule arrangement agreed to by the State. Such evidence, if true, should have 
been solicited during the direct examination of Stidham. 
Ortiz argues that he intended to challenge the testimony of Sutherland during closing 
arguments because Sutherland testified to something completely different than did Stidham. It is 
reasonable to conclude that the jury may not have believed the testimony of Sutherland when such 
testimony differed from that given by Stidham on the same subject. 
II. Counsel for the State illegally presented evidence of Defendant Mondragon* s prior conviction. 
Counsel for the State presented a document to Mondragon during cross-examination that 
had not been turned over to defense counsel after a Request for Discovery had been filed. 
Counsel for the State asked what the document was, and Mondragon responded that it was a 
prior adult conviction. The jury heard the response before defense counsel could object. Such 
action constitutes prosecutorial misconduct because the State knowingly brought to the attention 
of the jury a matter it would not be justified in considering in determining its verdict. (See, State 
v. Tenney. supra). Ortiz argues that such misconduct prejudiced the jury not only towards 
Mondragon but also towards Ortiz because the three defendants were tried jointly. 
In State v. Hay. 859 P.2d 1, 7 (Utah 1993), the Court held that the State had a duty to 
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turn over evidence to the defense that it had in its possession. The prosecutor in that case failed 
to turn over a knife to the defense that the defendant claimed had been used by the victim to 
attack him. The Court stated: 
[w]e think that the prosecution acted improperly when it did not offer the knife 
directly to the defense...It is important to emphasize that the prosecution has a 
duty to provide discovery materials to the defense on request. This duty extends 
to unrequested information that is or may be exculpatory. Rule 3.8(d) of the Rules 
of Professional Conduct requires a prosecutor to "[m]ake timely disclosure to the 
defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to 
negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense." Indeed, it is a violation of 
due process not to do so, whether or not the defense requests that information. 
Id. 
The Court continued by holding that "the prosecution's responsibility is that of a minister 
of justice and not simply that of an advocate... a criminal trial is more than a contest between the 
prosecution and the defense; it is a search for the truth." Id. 
Counsel for the State in the present case had no right to present such evidence to the jury. 
He knew, or should have known, that the evidence was inadmissabie and would likely be excluded 
by the court. Ortiz argues that his right to a fair trial was violated by the State's misconduct, and 
that a new trial should therefore be granted. Had defense counsel been aware that the State was 
in possession of such a document, Mondragon would not have taken the stand. Ortiz would not 
have been prejudiced by this document but for the prosecutor's misconduct. 
III. The State committed prosecutorial misconduct by asking an inflammatory question during its 
cross-examination of Sharon Ortiz. 
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Sharon Ortiz was called as a witness during the defendant's case-in-chief The only 
subject explored by defense counsel concerned the existence of proof of insurance and registration 
of the vehicle which was alleged to have been used in the burglaries. Counsel for the State, as he 
began his cross-examination, immediately made a comment regarding her son's and the other 
defendant's affiliation with gangs. Such an attempt to prejudice the jury is clearly prosecutorial 
misconduct. Counsel for the State knew or should have known that asking such an inflammatory 
question would prejudice the jury. (See, State v. Tenney. supra). 
The record demonstrates that counsel for the State knew this line of questioning was 
inappropriate. 
Beginning at p. 231,1. 15: 
Q: I'm going to ask you some questions about your son's involvement with the 
Serenos 13 gang, 
(defense counsel): Your honor, I'm going to object to that. That's not within the 
scope of my direct. 
The Court: The objection's sustained. 
(Counsel for the State): Very well. I'll withdraw that line of questioning. 
Ortiz argues that such misconduct clearly demonstrates that counsel for the State intended 
to prejudice the jury. Furthermore, Ortiz submits that such behavior creates an atmosphere that 
appears to be a contest between the prosecution and defense, rather than a search for the truth by 
the State. (See, State v. HayT supra). Conduct by the State such as this should not be condoned 
by this Court. 
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CONCLUSION 
Ortiz argues that the State's violation of the exclusionary rule; presenting to the jury a 
prior adult conviction of Mondragon; and the cross-examination of Sharon Ortiz, all amount to 
prosecutorial misconduct and therefore violated his right to a fair trial. Conduct such as that cited 
above should not be condoned by this court. Therefore, Ortiz respectfully prays that this court 
reverse his conviction and grant him a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this 3 day of December, 1997. 
Wayne A. Freesrone 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
*. hereby certify that on December 3, 1997, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief 
was deposited in the United States mail to the parties listed below: 
Christine Soltis 
Assistant Attorney General 
Criminal Appeals Division Heber Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Courtesy copy to: 
Douglas Ahlstrom 
Tooele County Attorney 
47 South Main Street 
Tooele, Utah 84074 
DATED this 3rd day of December, 1997. \ 
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ADDENDUM 
No addendum is necessary for this brief. 
